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INTRODUCTION
The operation of the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Economic
Community (E.E.C.)--established by France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg-undoubtedly affects enterprises
located within the territories of these Communities. This raises the question to what
extent enterprises and establishments, partly or totally owned by "foreign" corporations-i.e., corporations outside the Communities-may come under Community
jurisdiction. The concept of enterprise is to be examined from this aspect-a
problem closely related to the question of competence of the Communities' and
The primary problem centers
of the jurisdiction of the Community Court
around the question of competence of the quasi-legislative and administrative powers
of the Communities. The present exposition attempts to analyze some features
of this complex and somewhat unexplored question. It will, however, merely
touch on the jurisdiction of the Community Court and the parties that may invoke
its protection, since this question appears reasonably clear. Moreover, the
judicial control as invoked by a party's appeal for annulment or against inaction
represents a broader question whose discussion would greatly exceed the scope of
this paper.
Member States as well as private parties under Community jurisdiction may
appeal before the Community Court allegedly illegal acts of a Community organ or
its failure to act.4 The Treaties, of course, differentiate between appeals of Member
States and of private parties, and grant to States a more extensive right of appeal. In
specific instances, even third parties outside Community jurisdiction may appeal.U
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E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 8o; Euratom Treaty art. x96. Because of the general competence of the
E.E.C., its Treaty contains no such similar provision.
2
E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 33, 35; Euratom Treaty arts. 146, 148; E.E.C. Treaty arts. 173, 175.
a For a general discussion of this problem, see, e.g., Bebr, Protection of Private Parties Under the
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CONCEPT OF ENTERPRISE

455

fore, proper and in accord with the political structure if they are allowed to appeal
in their own right, independently of their Member States.
The qualification of a Member State as an appellant hardly needs to be elaborated.
The qualification of a private party to appeal appears equally simple. As none
of the Community Treaties defines the meaning of enterprise, one may quickly
conclude that in the context of standing to appeal, the term "enterprise" is to be
viewed as a legal concept. As a result of a partial integration as provided for by
the E.C.S.C. and Euratom Treaties, the legal and economic aspects of an enterprise
need not necessarily coincide.6 Its economic aspect delimits the competence of the
quasi-legislative and regulatory powers of the E.C.S.C. and Euratom in relation to
national economies that remain under the Member States' jurisdiction. The legal
concept of enterprise, on the other hand, points to the legal person that may act on
behalf of this economic unit before the Community Court. At first, such a splitting
of the concept of enterprise in its economic and legal aspects may seem arbitrary.
The following discussion may show that this "split" concept is but the unavoidable
consequence of a partial economic integration.
To view an enterprise in its economic and legal aspects is by no means unique
to the Community law. Similar examples may also be found in municipal public
laws, which pursue a great variety of public objectives in the fiscal, economic, social,
and labor fields. These laws require and develop their own concept of enterprise,
a concept that is not always identical with its legal form as formulated by civil or
commercial law.1 This analogy with municipal public laws may be carried even
further. Even though they develop their own concept of enterprise suitable to the
goals they pursue, when it comes to the question of ability to sue or be sued, they
necessarily resort to the traditional legal concept. A similar interplay and interrelation may be found in the E.C.S.C. and Euratom Treaties between the economic
concept of enterprise and the legal person to represent and protect it.
I
THE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF ENTERPRISE

A. The European Coal and Steel Community
According to article eighty of the Treaty, all enterprises that engage within the
European territories of the Member States in the production of coal and steel, as
technically defined by the Treaty and its annexes, or reclaim iron and steel scrap, are
subject to the Community. This production activity establishes the competence of
0CHARLES DE VISSCHER, LE DROIT PUBLIC DE LA COmmUNATr-i EUROPgENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'AciE
51-52 (956).
" See Gieseke, Der Rechtsbegriff des Unternehmens und seine Folgen, in E. WOLFF (ED.), BEITRAEGE
Zumt HANDELS-UND NVRTSCHAFTSREcNT 6o6 (1950), who emphasizes that even without a statute, the concept of enterprise is changing, depending on the various purposes of its-provisions; EuGEN LANGE, KommENTAR ZUm KARTELLGESETZ 55-56 (957);

HANS VON MULLER-HENNEBERG & GUSTAV SCHWARTz, GESETz

GEGEN WETTBEWERSBESCHAENRUNGEN 151 (958), who rightly stress the production and business activity
of an enterprise for the application of the law against restraining competition; Ballerstedt, Unternehmen
See also GEORGES RIPERT, ASPECTS
und Wirtschajtsverassung, 6 JnUSrSNZEITUNG 486, 487-88 (1951).
JuIUIQoUEs DU CAPITALISME MODEtNE 261, 274 (2d ed. 1951).
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the Community and forms the underlying concept of enterprise within the meaning
of the Treaty! As a result of this narrow competence, an enterprise may only partly
come under the Community jurisdiction-only in so far as it produces coal or steel
or reclaims scrap within the Community territoryP The Treaty evidently bases the
concept of enterprise on its specific economic activity: its legal form is irrelevant °
Although coal and steel consumers are outside the Community competence, a steel
enterprise within the meaning of article eighty of the Treaty is also subject to the
Community with regard to its coal or scrap consumption. 1 An enterprise remains
under the Community jurisdiction even if it does not produce in its own name.
The so-called processing agreements according to which an enterprise carries out
2
only a part of the production process is also an activity subject to the Community.'
Regulation of economic affairs must be concerned more with economic activities
and their effects than with their legal forms. If the competence of the E.C.S.C.
were exclusively based on a formal, legal concept of enterprise, skillful manipulation
of this concept could frustrate and paralyze any effort to maintain and administer a
common and competitive market. This "playing down" of the legal concept of enterprise has far-reaching consequences. Thus, a coal- or steel-producing enterprise, not
legally independent but located within the Community, by whomever owned or
controlled and wherefrom directed or administered, is under the jurisdiction of the
Community.' 3 Neither the "nationality" of such an enterprise nor the domicile or
seat of administration of a corporation to which it belongs is relevant. 4
The economic concept of enterprise is by no means uniform through the
Treaty.' 5 There are two main reasons for such a flexibility. First, its changing
concept results from the recognition that a Community competence may hardly
rest only on the narrow nature of this specific production activity. This is particularly
true of borderline situations in which such a narrow Community competence would
8
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"Ibid.
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permit a by-passing of the Treaty provisions. The scope of application of articles
sixty-five and sixty-six of the Treaty to the production of coal and steel as well as
to their distribution makes this especially evident. Secondly, the different purposes
of the various, specific Treaty provisions determine also the changing concept of
enterprise. These two questions will be examined at some length in the following
discussion.
i. Counterbalance to Pitfalls of PartialIntegration
A sharp, clear-cut separation of the coal and steel industries from the "rest" of the
national economy is economically artificial. A Community competence rigidly
limited to these industries would fly directly against economic realities. The Treaty
recognizes this shortcoming of a partial integration; it attempts to alleviate it by
extending the Community competence in specific instances to first-hand dealers or
organizations distributing coal or steel. Thus, article sixty-five, which prohibits "all
agreements ... all decisions of associations of enterprises, and all concerted practices,
tending directly or indirectly, to prevent, restrict or impede the normal operation of
competition within the common market," is binding on first-hand dealers and
organizations as well. Similarly, article sixty-six applies to their participation in an
illegal economic concentration with other coal or steel enterprises. The very nature
of concentration requires, moreover, that the Community competence be explicitly
extended to vertical integration. In this instance, any legal or natural person, even
though outside coal or steel production and their distribution, comes under the
competence of the Community. 6 Motivated by a similar consideration, the Treaty
is also applicable to buyers systematically discriminating among coal or steel

enterprises. 17 To prevent such a violation, the Community may require the enterprises of the E.C.S.C. to boycott such a buyer.'3
A gradual rapprochement of the first-hand dealers to the status of coal- and
steel-producing enterprises is dictated by the close economic ties existing between

production and distribution. The need for viewing this link primarily in terms of its
economic effects is apparent. A strict legal view would scrupulously respect a sales
agency as an independent legal entity, even though it is entirely directed and owned
by and composed of the coal-producing enterprises. Following this "dreamy"
legal approach, such a sales agency would be classified as a distributing organization within the meaning of article eighty and subject only to the provisions of articles
sixty-five and sixty-six. This example vividly demonstrates the need for an economic

concept of enterprise. If the Community is to operate at all, it must disregard the
hollow, legal mask of a formally independent enterprise and examine the actual
economic link existing between the coal-producing enterprises and the sales organization. The economic ties are in this instance so close and tight that the producers
and the sales agency actually represent one economic unit. The sales agency is

11 E.S.S.C. Treaty art. 66(i).
"I1d. art. 63(I).

1

" d. art. 63 (2b).
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nothing else but the "distributive arm" of the enterprises, it is part of them. Consequently, the sales agency would be subject to all Treaty provisions, and not only
to articles sixty-five and sixty-six.1 0 If this were not so, the coal or steel enterprises
could easily escape the price and discrimination provisions of the Treaty by establishing their own legally independent sales agency. While the more or less formal
and fictitious sales from the enterprises to the agency would be scrupulously correct,
the subsequent sales by their sales agency, being practically outside the Community
jurisdiction, could disregard the Treaty provisions. This would be an utterly untenable position because it would enable the enterprises to by-pass the Treaty provisions by establishing an independent legal person. Why should the High Authority
or the Court respect such a farce intended to avoid the Treaty provisions? Every
conceivable reason speaks against such a maneuver.
20
In this light may be understood an interesting dictum of the Court in Geitling.
In this case, the Court examined, among other charges, the restrictive effects on
competition of a questioned clause according to which dealers, in order to qualify as
first-hand dealers with a sales agency, had to draw a certain total amount of coal.21
As part of this prescribed amount, these dealers could include coal drawn from the
other two Ruhr sales agencies-a provision that the High Authority struck down
when approving the agreement for establishing these agencies. Examining this disputed clause, the Court placed the sales organization on the same level with the coal
producers. "On the basis of the disputed clause," observed the Court, "the appellants
included in the deliveries of the first-hand dealers also those that they obtained from
the other two sales organizations although they [i.e., the appellants] should be competing with them as with other producers of the Community whose deliveries the
appellants do not want to include in the total annual amount ....
Even in a reverse situation, the Court does consider the organic link between
production and distribution somewhat artificially disrupted by the partial integration. The Court is inclined to protect the first-hand dealers not only when articles
sixty-five and sixty-six are directly applied to them, but also when the application
23
of these articles aggrieves their interests.
The economic concept of enterprise permeates, in various degrees, the E.C.S.C.
Treaty and loosens and even disregards its legal concept. The controversy between
these two concepts and their relative meaning flared up in the recent scrap-iron cases.
To subsidize higher priced imports of scrap iron to the Community and prevent
price increases of "Community" scrap, the High Authority established a compensation
scheme that imposed a surcharge on the consumption of scrap iron by the enter19 KiEsEW=ER, op. cit. supra note IO,at 46-47; see also L'INSsTITUr DES RELATIoNs
LA COMMUNAUTP EUROPfENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'Aci . 170 (1953).
" Geitling v. Haute Autoriti, 3 REc. is (1957).
1

INTERNATIONIALES,

d. at 30-31.

(Writer's translation; emphasis added.)
"'Nold v. Haute Autorit , 3 REc. 235, 240-41 (1957-58), and the conclusions of the Avocat
G6n&al Roemer. Id. at 245, 251-52. See also Stork v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 45, 6x-62 (x958-59).
"I1d. at 44-45.
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4

prises. From this surcharge the Authority exempted only the consumption of
scrap iron reclaimed by the enterprises during their own steel production (so-called
"own" scrap iron)?. Consequently, the Authority considered the consumption of
the so-called "concern" scrap-i.e., scrap of a group of legally independent enterprises
that are closely tied together by financial, economic, and administrative linksto be subject to this surcharge. A concrete example may serve as an illustration:
A French steel mill, legally independent, but owned by Regie Renault up to 99.77
per cent, receives a large amount of scrap from Renault. 6 Because of this ownership
by Renault, the French steel mill tried to claim the scrap iron coming from the
holding company as the enterprises own scrap, free of any surcharge. Following
the legal concept of enterprise, the Authority refused to extend the concept of
"own" scrap iron beyond its formal ownership. "Only that scrap may be considered
as the enterprise's own," stated the Authority, "which is reclaimed in its own steel
mill managed under the same firm; on the other hand, scrap that comes from mills
of other firms must then be considered as purchased scrap iron even if there are
close financial or organizational ties between the supplier and the consumer."2
Several German and French enterprises appealed this refusal, arguing that the
economic concept of enterprise was the underlying principle of the Treaty.29 They
referred to the economic unit that these legally independent enterprises form and
to the close financial and economic ties that exist among them. Consequently,
argued the appellants, even the scrap iron transferred from one of these enterprises
to another should be considered as "own" scrap free of any surcharge. In its defense,
the Authority insisted on the ownership of scrap as determining the exemption 0
Being aware of the dangerous limitation inherent in applying a legal concept of
enterprise, the Authority wisely added a caveat that such a criterion was used in
this particular instance only. It wished so to forestall a risky, almost fatal, precedentcourting disaster as to the application of articles sixty-five and sixty-six. In this
particular instance, the Court followed the legal concept as advanced by the
Authority. But it did so only after having satisfied itself that the application of this
criterion was compatible with the economic and financial objectives of the compensation scheme. To exempt from the surcharge also "concern" scrap, as the
"own" scrap is exempted, would, in the Court's words, ".... exceed the meaning and
purpose of this exemption and, moreover, constitute an advantage discriminating
24 Decisions of the High Authority Nos. 22/54, [1954] JouRmNt OFFiCi.L 286; 14/55, [1955] id. at
685; and 2/57, [x957] id. at 6i.
" Letter from the High Authority to the Joint Bureau of Scrap Consumers, Dec. 18, z957, [1958] id.
at 45.
"S.N.U.P.A.T. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 Rac. 277, 286 (1958-59).
"Ibid.
"S.A.F.E. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 383, 404 (1958-59). (Writer's translation.)
"S.N.U.P.A.T. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 277, 291 (1958-59); S.A.F.E. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 Re. 383,
394-95 (1958-59).
" Phoenix-Rheinrohr v. Haute Autorit6, 5 Rac. 165, 174 (1958-59); S.N.U.P.A.T. v. Haute Autorit6,
5 Rac. 277, 292 (1958-59); S.A.F.E. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 383, 396 (958-59).
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against third enterprises" 3 1-i.e., enterprises outside the concern. Had the Court
found the legal concept of enterprise inadequate and hindering the achievement
of these objectives, it would have most likely set aside this criterion and searched
for an economic one better fitted to pursue these objectives. The Court seemed to
recognize the predominance of the economic goals of the Treaty and their
strong bearing on the concept of enterprise. "It would be evidently contrary to the
Treaty requirement," held the Court, "if a measure of the High Authority would
make the production cost of steel, entirely or partly produced out of scrap iron, de'3 2
pendent on the legal, organizational, or financial structure of an industrial concern.
2. Changing Concept of Enterprise

Brief references may be made to some more typical Treaty provisions that reflect
the changing concept of enterprise. Significantly, the provisions concerning the
annual levy to be borne by enterprises is to be assessed according to the average production level of the various products under the Community jurisdiction 3 Similar
references to production mark articles 58 (2) dealing with production quotas, and
article 59 (2) concerning consumption priorities. But the economic concept is not

always so clearly discernible. As a result of an unfavorable opinion rendered by the
High Authority on an investment project pursuant to article 54 (5), the enterprise
concerned may only use "its own funds to carry out such a project." The question of
what is to be understood by an enterprise's "own funds" raises a number of almost
insurmountable problems. In this context, the economic concept of enterprise discloses fully its relative, changing character. The situation of a legally and economically independent enterprise exclusively engaged in coal or steel production would
hardly present difficulties. But economic and financial relations and situations are
everything but simple and clear. Assume that an enterprise is active in several industrial fields and only partly produces coal or steel-as, for example, a shipyard
owning a steel mill or a chemical enterprise owning a coal mine. Under these circumstances, which funds are really this enterprise's "own funds?" It seems difficult,
if not impossible, to separate the funds of an enterprise in a proportion corresponding
to its coal or steel production. On the other hand, to permit this enterprise to utilize
for its project all the funds at its disposal derived from other activities would undermine, if not defeat, the purpose of this provision. Even if an enterprise exclusively
producing coal or steel and legally independent were restricted to using only its funds,
such a restriction could hardly be effective if the enterprise were an organic part of
a large holding company located in or outside the Community that might pour its
8' S.N.U.P.A.T. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 277, 3o6 (958-59);
407 (1958-59).

(Writer's translation.)

S.A.F.E. v. Haute AutortS, 5 RCe. 383,

'S.N.U.P.A.T. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 Rac. 277, 307 (958-59); S.A.F.E. v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REC. 385,
407 (x958-59). In his conclusions, the Avocat G~n&al Lagrange also justifies the legal concept of enterprise by the economic considerations of the objectives pursued by the compensation scheme. PhoenixRheinrohr v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 165, 183, 200-01 (x958-59). In the Avocat G ndral's view, a very
extensive interpretation of the "concern" scrap might have weakened the joint effort, based on economic
solidarity, to assure imports of scrap iron at the Community price level.
33 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 50(2).
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funds into this enterprise's proposed investment project. These remarks spotlight the
complex problem the Authority encounters when influencing the flow of investment
according to article fifty-four. They also reveal the variable economic concept of
an enterprise, a concept that is to assist the Authority in determining the proper
extent of its "own funds" available to the enterprise concerned. This extent should
correspond to the objectives of article fifty-four-i.e., to the establishment of a wellintegrated coal and steel industry within the Community with the maximum use of
available investment.
The economic considerations-and thus the economic concept of enterprise-rule
supreme, of course, over the provisions of articles sixty-five and sixty-six governing
the competition within the common coal and steel market of the Community. To
permit a clear, unhindered look at economic realities, the legal concept of enterprises must be penetrated.
These observations suggest that the E.C.S.C. Treaty knows no uniform concept
of an enterprise, as it is sometimes assumed. For example, a contrast of the concept
of enterprise within the meaning of article 54 (4) with that of article sixty-six
quickly dispels such an assumption. This should not be disturbing, because even
public municipal law knows no uniform concept of an enterprise. Its changing
economic concept underlying the different Treaty provisions may be justified by the
different purposes these provisions pursue. The changing emphasis of the Treaty
objectives-as reflected, for example, in the provisions dealing with discrimination or
competition--color and shape the economic concept of enterprise.
B. The European Atomic Energy Community
The Euratom Treaty also bases its competence on the activity of a natural or
34
legal person engaging in a highly technical production, as defined by the Treaty.
As under the E.C.S.C. Treaty, an enterprise may only partly come under the
competence of Euratom; its legal form is thus equally irrelevant? 5 Article eightyone particularly points to an economic concept of enterprise. According to this
article, the Commission has extensive powers of control to assure that ores, special
fissionable material, and other source material are not diverted by the user from
their professed use. The economic concept of enterprise on which the competence
of the Community rests is also strongly underscored by the provisions of article
eighty-six, according to which Euratom is the exclusive owner of plutonium and
uranium, whether imported or produced within the Community. This facilitates the
Commission's control over enterprises utilizing or processing this special fissionable
material.
C. The European Economic Community
The E.E.C. competence extends over the entire national economy of the Member
States. It encounters, therefore, much less need for developing a special concept
"Euratom Treaty art. x96.
" See Euratom Commission Reg. No. x, art. 2, [1958] JOURNAL OFFICIEL 51I; see also HANS -SUNNER
& KLAUS PFANNER, DER GEWERBLICHE REciiTsscHUTz S11 EURATOMVERTRAG

32 (1959).
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of enterprise, than is necessary under the E.C.S.C. and Euratom Treaties. The only
exception may be the general Treaty provisions of articles eighty-five and eighty-six
regulating competition, to be later implemented by Community regulations or directives. The nature of the matters to be regulated will undoubtedly again strongly
emphasize the economic concept of enterprise in disregard of its legal form.
II
THE LEGAL CONCEPT oF ENTER'PRisE

When the Treaty provisions are to be executed and enforced or the right of
appeal to be exercised, the economic concept of enterprise loses its usefulness and
justification. The economic concept of enterprise is in this instance merely the basis
for exercising the right of appeal by the legal entity entitled to represent it. Defining enterprises subject to its competence, the Euratom Treaty speaks of ".... any
enterprise or institution wholly or partly engaged in activities" as determined by the
appropriate chapters of the Treaty. 6 But it is worth noting that when the Euratom
Treaty deals with the right of appeal, it significantly states "any natural or legal
person."-" The replacement of the expression "enterprise" by the notion of a "legal
person" clearly points to a differentiation between an enterprise as an economic
notion and its legal form.3 s
Although that much is clear, still the question remains as to the law under
which the legal personality of an appealing enterprise should be examined. The
Community Treaties know no legal concept of enterprise independent of the
municipal law of the Member States. Examining the capacity to appeal, the Court
constantly resorts to the municipal law concerned. 3 9 But even this practice may not
always determine the proper law that may govern the forms, rights, and duties of a
corporation or of an enterprise if it is incorporated in one Member State but
maintains its actual seat of administration in another. Generally, according to the
Continental law and practice, the place of incorporation alone is inadequate for
establishing the proper law of corporation. As a rule, the place of incorporation as
well as the actual seat of administration in the Member State is required4 Conflicts
are likely to arise as soon as these two elements do not coincide. An even more
complex problem is presented in those instances in which a foreign corporation,
" Euratom Treaty art. 196.
"I1d. arts. 146(2), 148(3).

" It may be observed that the E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 33 and 8o do not differentiate so clearly.
"The provisions of the Rules of Procedure art. 38 § 5, [1959] JOURNAL OFFICIaL 349, which require
legal persons recognized by private law to attach to their appeals a copy of the statute giving them legal
personality, clearly indicate that in this instance, reference is made to the proper municipal law of the
Member State. This is particularly clearly stated in Nold v. Haute Autorit6, 5 Rac. 91, x1o (1958-59);
Fedechar v. Haute Autorit6, 2 REc. 201, 2o6 (1955-56). The avocat ginerals share this view. E.g.,
Roemer in Nold v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 91, 1x9, 123-25, 133 (958-59); Lagrange in Macchiorlatti
Dalmas e Figli v. Haute Autorit6, 5 REc. 415, 431, 433 (1958-59).
402 ERusr RABEL, THE CONFLICr OF IAWs 38 (1947); Audinet, The Right of Establishment in
the European Economic Community, 86 JOURNAL Du DaoIT INTERNATIONAL 983, 1017 (France 1959);
Thibi~rge, Le Statut des soci st etrangeres, in 75TH CoN oRs DES NorAIRES DE FRANCE, LE STATUT Dt
L'ETRAN OR ET LE MARCH COMmIu 239, 303-04 (1959).

CONCEPT OF ENT

Ri E

463

for one reason or another, maintains an establishment or a legally dependent enterprise in one of the Member States. The situation would be similar if, for example,
an American corporation, incorporated in Delaware, were to maintain its seat in
Belgium and operate an establishment in Germany or France. Without going
into any details, it may be safely assumed that such a corporation would not enjoy
a legal personality according to the European law. Only a treaty of friendship,
commerce, and trade concluded between the United States and a Member State,
which usually contains a special reciprocity clause as to the mutual recognition
of the legal personality of corporations, could uphold the right of such a corporation
to sue before a municipal court of the other State, even though it is not "domesticated" there 1 If such a treaty were concluded between a Member State and
a third State, the Community Court would undoubtedly recognize its legal consequences and uphold the right of such a corporation to appeal-assuming, of course,
that this corporation maintained within the Community an enterprise on whose
behalf it appealed.
"' See, e.g., the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, with the Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 2 Bundesgesetzblatt (Ger. Fed. Rep.) 487; [1956] 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, art. VI(i): "Nationals and companies . . .shall be accorded national treatment
with respect to access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies within the
territories of the other Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defence of their
rights. It is understood that companies of either Party not engaged in activities within the territorie
of the other Party, shall enjoy such access therein without any requirement of registration or domestication." See also art. XXV( 5 ): "Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within
the territories of either Party shall . . . have their juridical status recognized within the territories oE
the other Party."

